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Abstract 
While international commercial arbitration is widely regarded as an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism to litigation in national courts, those courts are frequently engaged in 
the review arbitral awards in the context of annulment as well as recognition and 
enforcement. A key purpose of this review is to ensure that the arbitral procedure is 
consistent with the fundamental principles of natural justice. These principles find their 
origin in the general principles of law common to civilised nations, and their application is 
mandated by both the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. This paper 
argues that the content of these principles should be ‘internationalised’. That is, it is both 
appropriate and desirable that domestic courts, irrespective of the jurisdiction in which they 
happen to be sitting, apply the basic rules of natural justice in uniform way. It is submitted 
that this would not only result in a consistent and therefore reliable recognition and 
enforcement regime, but would also contribute to the success and increased adoption of 
international arbitration as a key alternative dispute resolution mechanism. 
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I. Introduction 
In the case of Methanex Motunui Ltd v Spellman Fisher J opined that:1 
 
If the parties [to a dispute] say that they want arbitration, but in the same breath say that 
they do not want enforceable natural justice, their two statements are incompatible. 
Arbitration is a process by which a dispute is determined according to enforceable 
standards of natural justice. 
 
This penetrating dictum goes to the heart of the issues surrounding the review of 
arbitral awards by national courts for the breach of natural justice: even though 
arbitration is a private dispute resolution mechanism, and (in large part) a creature of 
contract, the validity of its outcomes ultimately remains subject to fundamental 
notions of procedural fairness. There thus exists a policy tension between the 
putative autonomy of the arbitral system and the need to ensure, by judicial 
supervision, compliance with the basic requirements of due process. Resolution of 
this tension necessitates consideration of the theoretical bases for arbitration and for 
natural justice. This analysis takes place in Part II of this paper.  
 A further set of issues is presented where the arbitration in question is of an 
international character. In international commercial arbitration an award’s binding 
legal nature is derived at the international level and from international law,2 while 
review of that award by a national court on natural justice grounds occurs at the 
domestic level, and with reference to the standards of the particular jurisdiction in 
which that court happens to be sitting. The central submission of this paper is that 
review of awards on natural justice grounds should be conducted with reference to 
what the paper terms “internationalised” natural justice standards. It is argued that 
these standards represent the fundamental core of natural justice, and constitute the 
criteria both necessary and sufficient to ensure due process and procedural fairness 
in international commercial arbitration, irrespective of where it occurs and in which 
jurisdiction its outcome is reviewed. This conclusion will be established as follows. 
                                                
1 Methanex Motunui Ltd v Spellman [2004] NZLR 95 (HC) at [50]. 
2 Commentary on the Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure Adopted by the International Law Commission 
at its Fifth Session A/CN.4/92 (1955) at 105 and the authorities there cited.  
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After the above-mentioned theoretical review in Part II, which will be marshalled to 
show the appropriateness and desirability of the internationalisation of natural 
justice, the paper will explore the legal basis for natural justice review of arbitral 
awards in Part III. Its international origins and current domestic application across a 
range of jurisdictions will be examined in detail. Part IV will then identify the 
fundamental problem inherent in those domestic applications – that is, their 
manifold and sometimes even parochial nature. Their implications and ultimate 
undesirability will be addressed. Finally, Part V will present the solution: the 
fundamental core of natural justice will be ascertained, and its viability as an 
internationally consistent standard will be established with reference to its 
international origins, universal value and the analogous precedent to be found in the 
realm of human rights law.  
II. The Theoretical Basis for Natural Justice Review of Arbitral Awards 
A consideration of the appropriate role of natural justice in the review of arbitral 
awards by domestic courts must begin with an exploration of its theoretical bases. 
There is a prima facie tension in the reality that the system of international arbitration 
provides a dispute resolution mechanism which is framed as separate from, and an 
alternative to proceedings in a domestic court, yet those same courts demonstrate a 
willingness to nullify the effect of awards which do not meet their particular 
standards of natural justice. This tension may be said to flow from a lack of clarity as 
to the exact nature of international arbitration, or at least from its unusual legal 
character.3 A brief examination of the competing positions on this issue will both put 
the role of natural justice in context and provide a theoretical basis for its 
internationalisation. 
A. The Nature of International Commercial Arbitration 
1. Four Theories  
                                                
3 See generally: Andrew Barraclough and Jeff Waincymer “Mandatory Rules of Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration” (2006) 6 MJIL. 
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It may be reasonably put forward that there are four major theoretical conceptions of 
the nature of international commercial arbitration.4 The first conception is essentially 
contractual. It holds that arbitration is fundamentally based on parties’ contractual 
election to submit their dispute for resolution to a (private) third party.5 The 
principle that pacta sunt servanda is emphasised and any “strong links” to national 
jurisdictions are denied.6  The second conception may be termed “jurisdictional”.  It 
stresses that international arbitration necessarily occurs within the jurisdiction of a 
sovereign State and is therefore subject to its supervisory authority.7 According to 
Gaillard, the debate between proponents of these two conceptions resulted in a 
compromised “hybrid” theory of international arbitration.8 This third conception 
holds that arbitration has a dual nature, relying on both jurisdictional and 
contractual elements:9 the system “must acknowledge the interaction of both its 
consensual basis and the legitimacy and support conferred on [its processes] by 
national legal systems.10 The final conception, rather than defining arbitration with 
reference to some point on a spectrum between contractual and jurisdictional 
theories, considers it to represent a wholly autonomous legal order.11 This arbitral 
legal order has been described as “supra-national” or “trans-national”, and is said to 
be rooted in the perception of international arbitrators that they do not operate on 
                                                
4 Hong-Lin Yu “A Theoretical Overview of the Foundations of International Commercial Arbitration” 
(2008) 1(2) Contemp Asia Arb J 255 at 255-283. See generally: Emmanuel Gaillard Legal Theory of 
International Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010) at 117.    
5 Barraclough and Waincymer, above n 3, at 5-6; see also: Julian Lew Applicable Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitral Awards (Dobbs Ferry, Oceana, 1978) at 59.  
6 Yu, above n 4, at 265.  
7 Ibid, at 258. 
8 Gaillard, above n 4, at 117. 
9 Yu, above n 4, at 274. 
10 Barraclough and Waincymer, above n 3, at 6-7; and Okezie Chukwumerije Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Arbitration (Quorum Books, Westport, 1994) at 11. 
11 Yu, above n 4, at 278. 
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behalf of any given State, but rather derive the legitimacy of their function from the 
consensus of a plurality of States.12  
2. Analysis  
At its extreme, the contractual theory would permit parties absolute freedom to 
determine all aspects of the procedure applying to their arbitration. This would 
include the ability to contract out of any requirements that natural justice be 
observed, which would be honoured by a domestic court at the setting aside or 
enforcement stage. The jurisdictional theory would place more emphasis on the 
supervisory role of national courts in ensuring that natural justice is complied with, 
while the hybrid theory – which is said to be the most popular – would suggest the 
application of a contextual and fact-dependent approach.13 The key point is that 
none of the above three conceptions necessarily precludes the standards of natural 
justice applied by domestic courts in review of awards being the internationalised 
ones for which this paper argues.  Further, it appears that the conception of 
arbitration as an autonomous legal order in fact lends support to the proposed 
adoption of those standards.   
 Gaillard presents two philosophical justifications for this theory, which he terms 
“jusnaturalist” and “transnational positivist”.14 As the name suggests, the 
jusnaturalist justification proceeds on the basis of natural law: if “higher values” are 
admitted (and they are by various schools of jurisprudence, as well as implicitly or 
even unconsciously by many legal practitioners) these may provide a justification for 
“the existence of a legal order that is superior to legal systems whose only merit is to 
have been generated by sovereign States”.15 Indeed, such a supra-national legal 
order has precedent in the historical lex mercatoria. Being universal, that dispute 
resolution mechanism was associated with no particular State and decided cases ex 
                                                
12 Yu, above n 4, at 278; and Gaillard, above n 4, at 35-36. 
13 Barraclough and Waincymer, above n 3, at 11. 
14 Gaillard, above n 4, at 39. 
15 Ibid, at 40-41. 
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aequo et bono – that is, on the basis of higher notions of justice and fairness.16 It is 
argued that the lex mercatoria is apt for analogy with the current system of 
international commercial arbitration. As Oppetit astutely observes:17  
 
[International commercial law] clearly manifests a desire for unity and universality, based 
on the common needs and interests of the international economic community. As such, it 
does not accord with a fragmentation of the international legal framework and encourages 
the use of unifying legal notions, such as lex mercatoria, general principles of law, or truly 
international public policy. 
 
An internationalised set of natural justice standards fits comfortably within such a 
unifying legal notion. If an autonomous arbitral legal order deriving its ultimate 
legitimacy from natural law is accepted, this provides a firm jurisprudential 
foundation for the internationalisation (or “supra-nationalisation”) of the natural 
justice standards applied in review of arbitral awards.  
 Gaillard’s “transnational positivist” justification also furnishes support for the 
internationalisation of natural justice standards. This approach reasons from the fact 
that “States broadly agree on the conditions that an arbitration must meet in order 
for it to be considered a binding method of dispute resolution, the result of which, 
the award, deserves their sanction in the form of legal enforcement”.18 The approach 
is positivistic insofar as it holds that arbitrators’ power to adjudicate rests on the 
ultimate recognition of their awards by states. It is transnational in its holding that, 
because no one State has a monopoly over an award’s recognition, a system “rising 
above each national system taken in isolation can be brought about by the 
convergence of all [national] laws”.19 This system is not defined in opposition to 
national laws, but emanates from States’ normative activity. It should be noted that 
unanimity is not required – it is sufficient that a particular norm commands general 
                                                
16 See generally: J H Baker “The Merchant Law and the Common Law” (1979) 38 CLJ 295.  
17 Bruno Oppetit Philosophie du Droit (Dalloz, Paris, 1999) at 119. 
18 Gaillard, above n 4, at 46.  
19 Ibid. 
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acceptance. In addition, this approach is said to facilitate and even accelerate the 
evolution of national laws towards greater consistency and away from “particularist 
solutions”.20 If it can be shown that a fundamental core of natural justice principles 
constitutes a norm flowing from the activity of a majority of states (and it will be 
shown below), this approach may also provide a jurisprudential basis for the 
internationalisation (or “trans-nationalisation”) of the standards of natural justice 
applied in review of awards.  
B. The Intersection of Natural Justice and Arbitral Autonomy 
Having examined the major theories as to the nature of international arbitration, it is 
profitable to explore the key policy considerations to which the application of 
natural justice gives rise, namely those inherent in the tension between the private 
and flexible nature of arbitration and the requirement of ensuring some minimum 
standards of procedural fairness. Such an enquiry is useful because it furnishes a 
framework through which decision-making in this area may be understood and 
analysed – it illuminates the concerns which motivated the development of the status 
quo and provides points of reference for the consideration of potential developments 
in the future, including for present purposes the internationalisation of natural 
justice. Four major policy themes may be identified. 
1. Integrity of the Arbitral System  
A first consideration is the need to preserve the integrity and legitimacy of the 
arbitral system. This supports a robust interpretation of natural justice principles. As 
Pullé observes, this need is becoming increasingly important for two reasons.21  
 First, arbitrations are increasingly being held in countries which have neither an 
established culture of arbitration nor history of perfect observance of the rule of law 
(at least in its Western conception). In 2011, for example, an Australian court found 
that an award issued in Mongolia should be not enforced in Australia due to its 
breaches of natural justice and consequent inconsistency with Australian public 
                                                
20 Gaillard, above n 4, at 50-52. 
21 Austin Pullé “Securing Natural Justice in Arbitration Proceedings” (2012) 20 APLR 64 at 65-66. 
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policy.22  This was so because a large award of damages had been issued against a 
company which was not party to the agreement to arbitrate. This point is 
particularly important in the context of smaller commercial entities, who are often 
obliged to sign standard form contracts which “mandate arbitration in a foreign 
land, [under] a foreign governing law and a foreign lex arbitri”.23 There is also 
suggestion that arbitrators may be motivated to issue awards against smaller parties 
in the hope of being re-appointed as arbitrators in future arbitrations by more 
powerful parties.24 
 Secondly, against the background of parties increasingly having recourse to 
arbitration instead of litigation as their preferred dispute resolution mechanism, it 
can be seen that awards are more internationally potent than court judgments in 
terms of their enforceability.25 This is because the grounds for refusing enforcement 
of awards are narrower than those for refusing enforcement of foreign judgments. 
Further, enforcement of a judgment depends on its recognition by a given foreign 
judgment statute, whereas “awards are portable and can be enforced in the more 
than 150 countries that are parties to the [New York Convention]”.26 
2. Finality of Awards 
A second consideration is that arbitral awards are designed to represent the final 
resolution of a dispute between parties. At first glance, this factor militates in favour 
of a comparatively restrained approach to natural justice review. On the other hand, 
it is possible to conceive that if national courts were particularly vigorous in their 
insistence on arbitrators’ compliance with natural justice standards, the latter would 
be incentivised to observe them strictly. This would in turn lead to fewer awards 
                                                
22 IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder [2011] VSCA 248. 
23 Ibid. See also: Aloe Vera of America Inc v Asianic Food (S) Pte Ltd [2006] SGHC 78. 
24 Pullé, above n 20, at 65-66. See also: Ruth Glick “California Arbitration Reform: The Aftermath” 
(2003) 38 USFL Rev 119. 
25 See: Albert Jan van den Berg “New York Convention Countries” (2009) New York Arbitration 
Convention < http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states>. 
26 Pullé, above n 21, at 65-66. 
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being set aside or refused enforcement, thus upholding their finality. The factor’s 
importance has been recognised by courts from various jurisdictions and is 
emphasised in a number of arbitration statutes.27 The International Arbitration Act 
1974 (Cth), for example, provides in s 39(2) that a court making a determination 
under that Act must “have regard to the fact that awards are intended to provide 
certainty and finality”. 
3. Autonomy 
A third consideration is that by agreeing to arbitrate, parties intend remove their 
dispute from national courts in favour of private dispute resolution. Courts have 
recognised this and have therefore exhibited a willingness to allow a degree of 
“indulgence” with respect to arbitrators’ compliance with natural justice principles. 
This is for four reasons. First, in choosing arbitration parties “trade the formality and 
the punctiliousness of a court proceeding in return for something quick and informal 
with the inevitable result that some corners will be cut”.28 Secondly, because 
arbitration is comparatively informal and private, rule of law concerns that justice be 
upheld in public are not of critical importance.29 Thirdly, most jurisdictions do not 
wish to be seen as hostile to arbitration by engaging in too high a level of scrutiny on 
natural justice grounds. In fact, jurisdictions compete amongst themselves to attract 
“lucrative arbitration business”,30 and one way to do this is to restrain national 
courts’ interference with awards as much as possible. Finally, because award-debtors 
frequently attempt to resist the enforcement of awards on natural justice grounds, 
such claims can become “jaded”, and as a result courts may require increasingly 
higher thresholds to be met and evidential burdens discharged.31 
                                                
27 See for example: Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd [2012] FCA 1214, 
at [30]. 
28 Pullé, above n 21, at 67. 
29 Ibid, at 67-68. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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 Respect for the comparative autonomy of the arbitral system is important. 
However, it has the potential to reduce the protections afforded to parties to 
arbitrations. This can be seen in the case of Sermalt Holdings SA v Nu-Life Upholstery 
Repairs Ltd, in which Bingham J observed that a national court will be unwilling to 
subject an arbitrator’s decision-making process to strict review, even where such 
review would have been required if the decision had been made by a judge or 
administrative official.32  
4. International Consistency 
A final matter in considering the application of natural justice in review of arbitral 
awards is that, because different jurisdictions may have different standards of 
“natural justice” there is the risk that the setting aside and refusal of recognition and 
enforcement regimes will be excessively inconsistent on the international plane. This 
would not only have negative consequences for predictability,33 but would also 
result in a situation where the validity or enforceability of an award would turn on 
the particular jurisdiction where the award was issued or where it was sought to be 
enforced, which could be entirely fortuitous. In addition, it could exacerbate existing 
problems of forum shopping. There is thus good reason for courts to interpret the 
natural justice ground of review in an internationally consistent way. 
III.    The Legal Basis for Natural Justice Review of Arbitral Awards 
It is to the legal basis for review of arbitral awards on the grounds of natural justice 
that the paper will now turn. It first examines the international origins of that basis 
in general principles of law, and then in specific formal international instruments. 
This analysis will show how the application of natural justice in international 
arbitration was developed in a decidedly international spirit. The paper will then 
examine how natural justice is applied by national courts in the domestic context, 
                                                
32 Ibid. See also: Sermalt Holdings SA v Nu-Life Upholstery Repairs Ltd [1985] EGLR 14. 
33 Barraclough and Waincymer, above n 3, at 8. 
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with a consideration of its content as elucidated by (primarily) Australasian case 
law. 
A. The International Origins of Natural Justice Review of Arbitral Awards 
1. General principles of law common to civilised nations 
It is submitted that the notion that arbitral awards may and ought to be reviewable 
on the grounds of breach of natural justice constitutes a general principle of law 
recognised by civilised nations. As such, it exists on the plane of international law by 
virtue of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It is 
further submitted that the broad principle comprises a number of other more 
specific general principles which together form the essential skeleton of natural 
justice: that the adjudicator be impartial and that all parties have an opportunity to 
present their case. 
(a)   No one may be a judge in his or her own case 
The first general principle of law which falls within the ambit of natural justice is 
that nemo debet esse judex in propia sua causa – no one may be a judge in his or her own 
case, or the rule against bias.34 There is a near universal acceptance of this principle, 
and it is supported by considerable authority. Though this paper is not an historical 
essay, a consideration of the historical significance and evolution of the principle is 
vital in establishing its content and universal pedigree. To that end, the follow brief 
survey will suffice.35  
 One of the grounds for an award’s annulment under the International Law 
Commission’s 1955 Draft Convention of Arbitral Procedure is that “that there has 
been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure”.36 One such 
                                                
34 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2006) at 279 and 357. 
35 See: Ibid, at 279-289; Commentary on the Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure Adopted by the 
International Law Commission at its Fifth Session A/CN.4/92 (1955) at 55-56.  
36 International Law Commission Commentary, above n 35, at 105. 
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fundamental rule is that parties have a right to “impartial treatment”.37 Though the 
principle can be traced back to (at least) Greek and Roman times, the Commission’s 
earliest authority is Pufendorf, who writing in 1688 said:38  
[An arbitrator’s] decision will surely not be binding upon us if it is perfectly obvious that he 
connived with the other party, or was corrupted by presents from him, or entered into an 
agreement to defraud us. For whoever clearly leans to one side or the other is unfitted 
further to pose as an arbitrator.  
The same sentiment was expressed by such eminent scholars as Bluntschli, Hall, 
Balasko, Carlston and Goldschmidt.39 An early arbitration which engaged the 
principle may be found in The Virginius Incident. In that case an American ship was 
captured by a Spanish naval vessel and 53 members of its crew – including 
Americans, Britons and Cubans – were tried and executed by the Spaniards. The 
incident immediately gave rise to a dispute between the American and Spanish 
governments, to be settled by international arbitration. The British government was 
asked to act as an arbitrator, but considered that it would be disqualified from doing 
so because it was itself likely to be a party to the arbitration.40 As it was stated in the 
Rudloff Case: “the jurisprudence of civilised States and the principles of natural 
law…guarantee to both [parties] the hearing and decision of a disinterested and 
impartial tribunal”.41 Other cases have made similar findings.42 A common thread 
                                                
37 Ibid, at 110. 
38 Ibid, at 106 and the authorities there cited.  
39 Ibid, at 106-110. 
40 The Virginius Incident 65 BFSP (1873-1874) 102. This award does not appear to be in the UNRIAA 
database. Cheng, above n 34 is relied upon. See generally: Richard Bradford The Virginius Affair 
(Colorado Associate University Press, Boulder, 1980). 
41 Rudloff Case (1903-1905) IX UNRIAA 255 at 258. 
42 See: Cheng, above n 34, at 279-289 and the authorities there cited. As examples of more recent cases, 
albeit in domestic contexts see: Sunrider Singh Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] UKPC 2, 
Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 557 (CA), R v Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [2000] 1 AC 119, Auckland Casino Ltd v Casino 
Control Authority Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 142 and Man O’War Station Ltd v Auckland City Council (No 1) 
[2002] 3 NZLR 577. 
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running through this jurisprudence is that the sources of the rule against bias are 
said to be both natural law, and general principles of law emanating from the 
practice of States. It is worth noting the parallel between this and Gaillard’s two 
justifications for the existence of an arbitral legal order mentioned above.   
(b)   Each party must be given the opportunity to present its case 
The second general principle of law falling within the scope of natural justice is that 
audiatur et altera pars – all parties should be heard.43 Referred to as the hearing rule, 
the principle holds that each party must be given adequate notice of proceedings, the 
opportunity to present and challenge evidence and to have that evidence properly 
considered. The principle has distinguished origins: it is said to have its roots in the 
Magna Carta.44 It is one of the grounds for nullity under the 1955 Draft Convention of 
Arbitral Procedure and one of Bluntschli’s principles rendering an award void.45 
Moreover, it is supported by unequivocal statements from Heffter, Goldschmidt, 
Carnazza-Amari and Fauchille.46 It also has a history of application by international 
tribunals and courts.  
 In 1926 a Belgo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, in reviewing awards against 
the city of Antwerp issued by special German arbitral tribunals set up in Belgium 
during the First World War said, in light of the fact that the city was unable to be 
represented through no fault of its own: “The absence of the defendant party 
destroyed the equilibrium between the parties which would have existed before the 
ordinary tribunals and would, therefore, have resulted in excessive sentences on the 
City of Antwerp”.47 This constituted a “fundamental defect” in the arbitral 
                                                
43 Cheng, above n 34, at 290. This principle is also referred to by the phrase audi alteram partem: hear 
the other party.  
44 See: Magna Carta (1297) 25 Edw 1, c 39. See also: S E Edeko “The Protection of the Right to Fair 
Hearing in Nigeria” (2011) 1(1) SJHR 68.  
45 International Law Commission Commentary, above n 35, at 117. 
46 See: Ibid, at 110. 
47 Ville d’Anvers Case (Indemnity) (1926) 6 TAM 749 at 752.  This award does not appear to be in the 
UNRIAA database. Cheng, above n 34, at 291 is relied upon. 
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procedure.48 As the Salvador Commercial Co case held: “due process of judicial 
proceedings” requires “notice [and] full opportunity to be heard…”49 According to 
Cheng, explicit refusal to hear one of the parties in an international judicial 
proceeding may be said never to have happened.50 He notes, however, the “Umpire 
Cases” before the Granadine-United States Claims Commission, in which the Umpire 
stated that “some remarks [had been] made as to a hearing on the merits…[but] as 
no further measures were taken for a hearing, at the last moment, as the Commission 
was expiring, I filed the awards”.51 This failure to hear argument on the merits 
before passing judgment on them constituted a procedural “insufficiency” and 
rendered the award null.52 It is important to recognise that the principle requires not 
only that a party be afforded the opportunity to present its case, but also the 
opportunity to respond to the case of the other party. Such a procedure was included 
in numerous international dispute resolution treaties, including the Hague 
Convention of 1907, the Statute of the International Court of Justice and the Statute 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice.53 The principle also operates to 
ensure that a party is able to reply to, or comment upon any newly adduced 
evidence or alteration or amendment of the legal basis of the claim.54 It does not, 
however, protect a party who has had a reasonable opportunity to be heard, but has 
declined that opportunity by absenting itself or otherwise wilfully failing to present 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid; Mixed Claims Commission United States-Venezuela (1930) IX UNRIAA 113, at 275.  
50 Cheng, above n 34, at 291. 
51 Ibid, at 291-292. 
52 Ibid, at 292. 
53 See Cheng, above n 34, at 293 and the authorities there cited.  
54 Eastern Greenland Case (1933) PCIJ A/B 53.. This award does not appear to be in the UNRIAA 
database, though is cited as above there and available online at 
<http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1933.04.05_greenland.htm>; and Cheng, above 
n 34, at 295. 
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its case, without valid reason.55 This aspect of the principle is well summarised by 
Article 53 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (reproduced 
in essence in Article 53 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice): 
“Whenever one of the parties shall not appear before the Court, or shall fail to 
defend his case, the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of his 
claim”.56  
 In addition to its international application, the principle has long been applied 
domestically by civilised States. In the criminal context, Lord Fortesque famously 
stated in R v Chancellor and Scholars of the University of Cambridge (Dr Bentley’s Case):57  
The laws of God and Man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has 
any. I remember to have had it observed by a very learned man upon such an occasion that 
even God Himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his 
defence. 
It is again noteworthy that the principle’s foundations are said to be both natural law 
(albeit expressed in religious language) and general principles of law common to 
mankind. Other cases in which the principle has been applied include Ridge v 
Baldwin, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody and Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v AF.58 
2. Formal legal instruments 
Having examined the origins of the two fundamental principles of natural justice as 
general principles of law common to civilised nations, it will now be profitable to 
give a more detailed consideration to the translation of those principles in particular 
                                                
55 Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (1939) PCIJ A/B 77. This award does not appear to be in the 
UNRIAA database, though is available online at < 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1939.04.04_electricity1.htm>. 
56 For an example of the Article’s application see: Corfu Channel Case (Compensation) (1949) ICJ Rep 
244.  
57 R v Chancellor of Cambridge and Scholars of the University of Cambridge (1723) 1 Str 557. 
58 Ridge v Baldwin [1963] AC 40 (HL), R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody 
[1994] 1 AC 531 (HL) and Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2010] 2 AC 269 (HL).  
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international instruments. Before exploring the main instruments with which this 
paper is concerned – the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration59 – it will be useful here to canvass a selection of other 
similar instruments which enshrine natural justice principles, in addition to the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice mentioned above. This will lend further 
weight to the argument that these principles are of a trans-national nature.  
 Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules parties must communicate notice of 
any arbitration (Articles 3 and 4), and must be treated with equality as well as given 
a reasonable opportunity to present their case (Article 17).60 The ICSID Convention 
allows for review of an award on the ground that there has been a serious departure 
from a fundamental rule of procedure, which “[includes] under its ambit the so-
called principles of natural justice”.61 Article 11 of the ICC Arbitration Rules requires 
arbitrators to “remain impartial and independent” and Article 22 mandates that the 
Tribunal “act fairly and impartially and ensure that each party has a reasonable 
opportunity to present its case”.62 Article 14 of the London Court of International 
Arbitration’s Rules contains the same provision in materially identical language.63 
Similar rules can be found in other arbitration rules and model procedures. The 
important point, however, is that the principles of natural justice clearly operate on 
the international level, and there appears to be broad agreement as to their 
generalised content.  
                                                
59 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (10 June 
1958) 330 UNTS 38 (the New York Convention); and UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (21 June 1985) (the Model Law).  
60 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (25 June 2010), arts 3, 4 and 17. 
61 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nations of Other States 
(14 October 1966), art 52; and ICSID History of the ICSID Convention: Documents Concerning the Origin 
and the Formulation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States (1970) Vol II at 480.  
62 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration 2010, arts 11 and 22.  
63 London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Arbitration Rules 1998, art 14.  
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(a)   The New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law 
The New York Convention of 1958 relevantly provides that the domestic recognition 
and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if “the party against whom the 
award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or 
of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case”.64 It also 
provides that a national court can refuse recognition and enforcement where such 
recognition and enforcement would be “contrary to the public policy of that 
country”.65 Adopting this language, Article 34 of the Model Law allows for the 
setting aside of an award on those two grounds, while Article 36 allows for the 
refusal of recognition and enforcement, again on those two grounds. Article 18, in 
addition, provides that parties must be treated with equality and given the 
opportunity to present their case.66  
 It is at this point worth giving consideration to the curious fact that, while the 
New York Convention and Model Law enumerate exclusive grounds for the setting 
aside and refusal of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards,67 and certainly 
include some form of natural justice among those grounds, the words “natural 
justice” (or the arguably equivalent terms “due process” or “procedural fairness”) 
are not used. It appears prima facie that only the hearing rule is explicitly stated. 
While the reality that the ground in question is not in fact limited to the hearing rule 
is discussed below with respect to the text and utility of the instruments,68 it is useful 
here to confront this ambiguity in light of their development and context. As a 
starting point, the predecessor to the New York Convention – the Geneva 
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards – contained a natural 
justice exception applying in circumstances circumstances where “the party against 
whom [it] is sought to use the award was not given notice of the arbitration 
                                                
64 New York Convention, above n 59, art V(1)(b).  
65 Ibid.  
66 UNCITRAL Model Law, above n 59, arts 18, 34 and 36. 
67 New York Convention, above n 59, art V(1); ibid arts 34(1) and 46(1). 
68 At IV(B). 
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proceedings in sufficient time to present his case”.69 It is worth observing that the 
focus of the provision was exclusively on a lack of notice as causative of breach of the 
hearing rule. But in fact the hearing rule may be breached in numerous other ways. 
Given this necessity for a broader construction, it appears that the provision was not 
interpreted textually, but rather “cover[ed] all cases involving a serious violation of 
due process”.70 It is submitted that the position with respect to the New York 
Convention is analogous. Indeed, a certain broadness of principle in the natural 
justice exception is hinted at in the Conflict of Laws: “[The] ground is in substance a 
defence of absence of natural justice… [which] gives effect to a general principle of 
law…”71 This is not dissimilar to one exception to the recognition and enforcement 
of a foreign judgment, which may be impeached if the proceedings in which it was 
obtained were “opposed to natural justice”.72 In the interests of comparison, and 
adding further weight to the submitted broadness of the natural justice exception in 
the arbitration context, it is worth noting that one ground for refusal of recognition 
and enforcement of an award at common law was also that “the proceedings in 
which it was obtained were opposed to natural justice”.73 
 The contention that the natural justice exception is not limited to a strict textual 
construction finds strong support in the relevant travaux préparatoires. At 
UNICTRAL’s 18th session, a concern was raised that the enumerated grounds for 
setting aside and refusal of recognition and enforcement under the Model Law may 
be too restrictive and insufficient to cover all procedural injustices which merited 
supervisory intervention.74 The treatment of this concern with respect to the natural 
                                                
69 Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards 92 LNTS 302 (1929-30) art 2(1)(b). 
70 Albert Jan Van den Berg New York Arbitration Convention of 1985 (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, The Hague, 1981) at 297. See also: H W Greminger, Die Genfer Abkommen von 1923 und 
1927 über die international private Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (Verlag P G Keller, Winterthur, 1957).  
71 Dicey, Morris and Collins The Conflict of Laws (15th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012) at 891. 
72 See: Ibid, at 740-745. 
73 Ibid, at 882-883. 
74 See: UNCITRAL, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the 
work of its eighteenth session Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No 17 
(3-21 June 1985) UN Doc A/40/17 at [277]. 
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justice ground for the setting aside of an award (Article 34(2)(a)(ii)) is particularly 
instructive. It was proposed that the exception be supplemented by incorporation of 
the wording of (what was then) Article 19(3).75 Article 19(3) materially provided that 
“the parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full 
opportunity of presenting his case”.76 (This is identical to what is now Article 18). 
However, the proposal was not adopted because:77 
the alignment between articles 34 and 36 was thought to be more important than the 
alignment between articles 34 and [18] and that it was the Commission’s understanding 
that, in spite of the resulting difference between the text of article [18] and article 34(2)(a)(ii), 
any violation of article [18] would constitute a ground for setting aside the award under 
article 34(2) subparagraph (a)(ii), subparagraph (a)(iv) or subparagraph (b) and that the 
concerns which led to the proposal to amend subparagraph (a)(ii) were, therefore, already 
met.  
The import of this history is that UNCITRAL considered that the natural justice 
exception in Article 34(2)(a)(ii) could operate as a ground for setting aside an award 
because of a breach of the broader natural justice requirements enshrined in Article 
18. The apparent textual circumscription of Article 34(2)(a)(ii) in only covering the 
hearing rule is illusory: it includes the rights enshrined in Article 18, one of which is 
the rule against bias. It appears that this was not made explicit due to stylistic 
considerations which prevailed during the drafting process. It is curious that the 
broader rights in Article 18 were not simply incorporated into both Articles 
34(2)(a)(ii) and 36(1)(a)(ii) given that this would have resolved the alignment 
concerns. While this point does not appear to have been addressed in the travaux 
préparatoires, it is submitted that a reasonable assumption may be made that the 
broader approach to Article 34(2)(a)(ii) applies also to Article 36(1)(a)(ii).  
B. Domestic Application 
                                                
75 Ibid, at [287]. 
76 Ibid, at [170]. 
77 Ibid, at [302]. 
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In light of the above discussion of the international origins and sources of natural 
justice and its application in review of arbitral awards, the paper will now turn to 
the domestic legal bases for that review, which flow, generally speaking, from the 
adoption of the New York Convention and the Model Law (or the enactment of 
statutes in essentially similar terms). This is the position in New Zealand and 
Australia. Schedule 1 of the Arbitration Act 2006 (NZ) reproduces (with certain 
amendments) the Model Law, and by s 16 of the International Arbitration Act 1974 
(Cth) provide that (subject to certain provisions) the Model Law has the force of law 
in Australia. The paper will first examine the general standards of review applied 
with respect to natural justice, then specific examples of its content drawn from a 
number of Australian and New Zealand cases.  
1. The general standard required for breach of natural justice 
The modern jurisprudence on the appropriate scope of the natural justice ground for 
appears to suggest two broad approaches. The first requires a comparatively serious 
and fundamental breach of natural justice to render an award subject to setting aside 
and refusal of recognition and enforcement; whereas the second holds that any 
breach of natural justice is prima facie sufficient for that purpose.   
 The first approach finds early expression in the United States case of Parsons & 
Whittlemore Overseas Co v Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier (RATKA), in which 
the Court found that enforcement under Article V of the New York Convention 
should be refused only where it would “violate the forum state’s most basic notions 
of morality and justice”.78 Though this case was concerned primarily with the public 
policy exception, that exception is often regarded as intrinsically bound up with the 
natural justice exception and statements relating to the former are applied in the 
context of the latter (this point is taken further below). The Court was motivated to 
make its finding as follows. First, it was contended that “the legislative history of the 
provision offers no certain guidelines to its construction”.79 The precursors to the 
                                                
78 Parsons & Whittlemore Overseas Co v Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier (RATKA) 508 F 2d 969 (2d 
Cir) 1974 at 974; see also Castel Electronics above n 27, at [9]. 
79 Ibid, at [7]. 
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New York Convention had extended the exception to awards “contrary to principles 
of law” and awards which violated “fundamental principles of the law”. While one 
commentator suggested that the Convention’s failure to include similar language 
signified a narrowing of the defence,80 others were of the view that the omission was 
indicative of an intention to broaden it.81 On balance, the Court was persuaded by 
the Convention’s pro-enforcement bias and pragmatic considerations of 
reciprocity:82  
Perhaps more probative, however, are the inferences to be drawn from the history of the 
Convention as a whole. The general pro-enforcement bias informing the Convention and 
explaining its suppression of the Geneva Convention83 points toward a narrow reading of the public 
policy defence. An expansive construction of this defence would vitiate the Convention’s 
basic effort to remove pre-existing obstacles to enforcement… Additionally, considerations 
of reciprocity – considerations give express recognition in the Convention itself [in Article 
XIV] – counsel courts to invoke the public policy defence with caution lest foreign courts 
frequently accept it as a defence to enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in the United 
States [emphasis and citations added]. 
A similarly narrow approach was taken by the English Court of Appeal in Deutsche 
Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v Shell International Petroleum Co Ltd, with 
Lord Donaldson adding that consideration of the ground “should be approached 
with extreme caution”.84 The approach has also found favour in cases from Hong 
Kong, Canada, and Singapore.85 It was taken up by the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in Amaltal Corporation Ltd v Maruha (NZ) Corporation which suggested, inter 
                                                
80 Paolo Contini “International Commercial Arbitration” (1959) 8 Am J Comp L 285 at 304. 
81 Leonard Quigley “Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards” (1961) 70 Yale LJ 1049 at 1070-1071; 
Parsons & Whittlemore, above n 78, at [7]. 
82 Ibid, at [8]. 
83 The predecessor to the New York Convention. 
84 Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v Shell International Petroleum Co Ltd [1990] 1 AC 
295.  
85 Hebei Import and Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd [1999] 2 HKC 205; Attorney General of 
Canada v SD Myers Inc [2004] 3 FCR 368; and PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 
1 SLR(R) 597. 
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alia, that the natural justice ground could only be invoked where “fundamental 
principles” had “obvious[ly]” been breached.86 Similarly, the High Court in Downer-
Hill Joint Venture v Government of Fiji the Court stated at [84] that:87 
Even assuming that Downer could establish is a breach of…natural justice, the ‘public 
policy’ requirement in art 34 [of the Model Law] imposes a high threshold on Downer. 
The phrases ‘compelling reasons’ and ‘a very strong case’ are employed in [the 
precedential Hebei decision.88] [T]here must be the likelihood that the identified 
procedural irregularity resulted in a ‘substantial miscarriage of justice’. 
These restrictive frameworks are likely to be, at least in part, a product of the factual 
and procedural matrices from which they arose. In the Downer-Hill case the Fijian 
Government contracted Downer, a construction company, to upgrade certain 
highways in Fiji.89 There was a dispute as to the amount payable, which was referred 
to arbitration pursuant to the contract. The Tribunal found in favour of the 
Government of Fiji. Downer applied to set aside the award in New Zealand under 
Article 34 based on various assertions of breaches of natural justice and public policy 
constituted by, inter alia, an alleged lack of evidence in support of the Tribunal’s 
findings, a failure to determine one of Downer’s claims and the denial of an 
opportunity for Downer to be heard. Following this, the Government of Fiji applied 
to strike out Downer’s application on the grounds that it disclosed no reasonable 
cause or action or was otherwise an abuse of the Court’s processes. The Court held 
that Downer’s claims were essentially unfounded: the evidentiary basis for the 
award was sufficiently indicated, all issues were addressed and there was no breach 
of the hearing rule (in addition, some of Downer’s claims were time-barred). It is a 
reasonable inference that the in the circumstances where an application is essentially 
unfounded, or at least where the impugned award contains no obvious breach,90 a 
                                                
86 Amaltal Corporation Ltd v Maruha (NZ) Corporation [2004] 2 NZLR 614; see also Castel Electronics 
above n 27, at [47]-[51].  
87 Downer-Hill Joint Venture v Government of Fiji [2005] 1 NZLR 554.  
88 See: Hebei Import and Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd, above n 85.  
89 The facts are summarised from Downer-Hill Joint Venture, above n 87, at [1]-[22]. 
90 See: Ibid, at [84]. 
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high threshold will apply. This is consistent with “the recognised benefits of 
arbitration [which] include speed, economy…and finality”.91 There is an implicit 
downplaying of the Court’s supervisory role in situations where a breach is not “at 
least fairly readily apparent”.92 A similarly narrow approach has been adopted in 
various Australian cases.93 
 The second general approach, deeming any breach of natural justice to be 
contrary to public policy and thus capable of justifying the setting aside or refusal of 
recognition and enforcement finds support in a more limited number of Australian 
and New Zealand cases. The Court in Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Air Conditioner 
(Zhongshan) Co Ltd stated at [29] that: 
The plain words of [the International Arbitration Act 1974] unambiguously declare 
that if any breach of natural justice occurs in connection with the making of the award 
then, for the purposes of arts 34 and 36 [of the Model Law], the award is in conflict 
with or contrary to the public policy of Australia.  
This was consistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Victoria in IMC 
Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder.94 Additionally, the conclusions in Castel 
Electronics were adopted in New Zealand by Courtney J in Ironsands Investments Ltd v 
Toward Industries Ltd.95 
 Though the above two approaches are distinct in requiring different degrees of 
severity of breach of natural justice to allow an award to set aside or subject to 
refusal of recognition or enforcement, it seems that in practice both approaches are 
likely to lead to similar outcomes. This is because those jurisdictions which adopt the 
second approach – Australia and New Zealand – are of the view that their courts 
                                                
91 Ibid, at [62]. 
92 See: Ibid at [60-61]. 
93 See: Castel Electronics, above n 27; and Uganda Telecom Ltd v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd (2011) 277 ALR 
415 at [132]. 
94 IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder [2011] VSCA 248, at [35], [37] and [129].  
95 Ironsands Investments Ltd v Toward Industries Ltd CIV-2010-404-004879, 8 July 2011 at [19]. See also: 
Daniel Kaldermis “Arbitration and Administrative Law – When Two Worlds Collide” (2012) Kluwer 
Law International <http://kluwer.practicesource.com/blog/2012/>. 
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retain an ultimate discretion as to whether or not to interfere with an award, 
notwithstanding that it may prima facie satisfy the setting aside or refusal of 
recognition and enforcement provisions of their respective Arbitration Acts.96 As 
Courtney J noted in Ironsands, “[i]t is unlikely that the Court would exercise its 
discretion to set aside an award where the relevant breach of natural justice is minor 
and could have had no bearing on the outcome”.97  
2. Specific illustrations 
The following cases constitute examples of the circumstances in which courts have 
and have not been willing to set aside or to refuse to recognise and enforce awards 
on the grounds of natural justice. A good example of the application of the hearing 
rule is found in A-G v Tozer (No 3).98 In that case a significant piece of documentary 
evidence was provided to the arbitrator, but was not provided to the other party, 
which therefore had no opportunity to challenge it. Because the arbitrator had relied 
on the document in making the award, it was found to entail a breach of natural 
justice in that the party without access to the document was denied the opportunity 
of properly presenting its case.99 In contrast, claims based on alleged breaches of the 
hearing rule were denied in Hirstich v Kahotea and Hi-Gene Ltd v Swisher Hygiene 
Franchise Corp.100 In the former case the applicant claimed that she had been unable 
to present her case because there had been no oral hearing. This was held not to be 
the case, however, because parties to the arbitration had previously agreed to 
conduct the hearing on the basis of written submissions.101 The latter case centred on 
the respondent’s allegation that it was denied the opportunity to present its case 
because it was unfairly refused an adjournment. However, it transpired that the 
                                                
96 Castel Electronics, above n 27, at [33]; and Ironsands Investments, above n 25, at [20]. 
97 Ironsands Investments, above n 95, at [20]. 
98 A-G v Tozer (No 3) HC Auckland M1528-IM02; CP607/97, 2 September 2003; see also Green and Hunt 
on Arbitration Law and Practice (Online Looseleaf Ed, Brookers).  
99 Ibid.  
100 Hirstich v Kahotea HC Auckland  M/404/184SW02, 3 April 2003; and Hi-Gene Ltd v Swisher Hygiene 
Franchise Corp [2010] NZCA 359. 
101 Ibid; Green and Hunt, above n 98. 
 
 
30 
 
respondent had in fact failed to directly ask the Tribunal for an adjournment until 
just before the hearing, and did not provide a reasonable explanation for requesting 
one.102 In these circumstances the Court found that there was no breach of natural 
justice. As another ground for breach, it was suggested in Westport Insurance 
Corporation v Gordian Runoff Ltd that the failure of a Tribunal to provide adequate 
reasons for its decision may also qualify.103 
 In addition, the principles of natural justice will be breached where an award 
makes a finding on an issue that was not raised during proceedings, but may be of 
later relevance to a party. This was the position in Todd Petroleum Mining Co Ltd v 
Shell (Petroleum Mining) Co Ltd.104 It also occurred in the Ironsands case, the facts of 
which are as follows.105 The claimant, Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Ltd 
(CKI) contracted to purchase an iron mining operation owned by New Zealand Steel 
Ltd (NZS). Under this contract, CKI was bound to use all reasonable endeavours to 
obtain consent for its investment from the Overseas Investment Office. Subsequent 
to entering into the contract CKI made the decision that upon purchase of the mining 
operation it would close it down, and advised the Office of this fact. The Office 
refused investment consent. NZS alleged that CKI had breached its contractual 
obligations, and this was accepted by an arbitrator, who found CKI’s decision to 
close the mining operation was incompatible with its obligation to use all reasonable 
endeavours to obtain investment consent. CKI’s obligation of honesty requiring it to 
notify the Office of its decision did not immunise it from this breach of contract. 
CKI’s application to set the award aside was partially successful.  The arbitrator had 
made a finding that investment consent would have in fact been obtained but for 
CKI’s decision to close the mine. This was capable of constituting a breach of natural 
justice: the arbitrator was only required to find whether CKI took reasonable 
endeavours to obtain consent – he need not have considered the likelihood of 
                                                
102 Hi-Gene Ltd v Swisher Hygiene Franchise Corp, above n 100; and Green and Hunt, above n 98.  
103 Westport Insurance Corporation v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2011] HCA 37.  
104 Todd Petroleum Mining Co Ltd v Shell (Petroleum Mining) Co Ltd HC Wellington CIV-2008-485-2816, 
17 July 2009; and Green and Hunt, above n 98. 
105 Ironsands Investments, above n 95. 
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consent being granted. That factor was to be relevant in the later determination of a 
remedy. By deciding the issue of likelihood the arbitrator had effectively pre-empted 
argument on this issue, meaning that CKI had not had an opportunity to be heard 
thereon.   
 It is useful at this point to give detailed consideration to a prominent case in the 
enforcement of foreign judgments context – Adams v Cape Industries Plc.106 This is so 
because, in addition to the analogous nature of the enforcement of foreign judgments 
to the enforcement of arbitral awards, the discussion of natural justice in the case is 
relevant as representing a leading school of thought on the subject in the wider 
common law world. Because that discussion can only be fully appreciated in light of 
the facts of the case, it is to those which the paper now turns.107 Cape was the English 
parent of a group of companies engaged in the mining and marketing of asbestos. 
The worldwide marketing was handled by another English company, Capasco; 
while the marketing in the United States was conducted by a United States 
company, NAAC. Both were wholly owned subsidiaries of Cape. A further South 
African subsidiary mined the asbestos, which was sold for use in a factory in Texas.  
In 1974, some 462 plaintiffs, most of whom were employees or former employees of 
the Texas factory brought an action in the Federal District Court in Tyler, Texas (the 
Tyler 1 actions). Cape, Capasco, NAAC and the South African subsidiary were 
named as defendants, in addition to the Government of the United States. Though 
Cape and Capasco protested the Tyler court’s jurisdiction, the actions were settled in 
1977 for $20 million, of which Cape and its subsidiaries bore $5 million. However, 
between 1978 and 1979 a further 206 plaintiffs made claims in the same court against 
the same defendants (the Tyler 2 actions). Cape and Capasco elected not to defend 
these actions, maintaining that the Tyler court lacked jurisdiction. They were 
prepared to let default judgments be entered against them and then to resist 
attempts at their enforcement in England. In 1983 the Tyler 2 plaintiffs agreed to 
settle their actions insofar as they were against the United States Government on the 
                                                
106 Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433; [1990] 2 WLR 657; [1991] 1 All ER 929 (CA). 
107 The facts are taken from the source ibid, at 434-454. 
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understanding that they would receive default judgments and the Government 
would then finance their enforcement actions in England. Default judgments were 
granted on 12 September 1983 pursuant to the United States Federal Rules which 
provided, inter alia, that the pleaded claims were (save in relation to damage) taken 
to be admitted. No judicial hearing took place. The awards make to individual 
plaintiffs fell into different monetary bands (67 were awarded $37,000, 31 $60,000, 47 
$80,000 and 61 $120,000). The judge directed that the total award should represent an 
average award of $75,000 per plaintiff but it was the plaintiffs’ counsel who chose 
the level of the bands and identified which plaintiffs were to be placed in each band 
in order to arrive at the directed average award.  
 In the first instance enforcement proceedings Scott J dismissed the actions for 
several reasons.108 The key reason for present purposes was that the procedure 
adopted by the Tyler 2 court in its default judgment was offensive to the principles 
of natural justice. This was so because there had been no judicial determination of 
the defendants’ liability and the award of damages had been arbitrary, not based on 
evidence and not related to the individual entitlements of the various plaintiffs. This 
ground (among others) was upheld by the Court of Appeal, whose reasoning it is 
profitable to explore. 
 At the outset, the Court made the astute observation that:109 
[W]hether any alleged breach of natural justice based on procedural irregularity is such as 
to render [a] foreign judgment unenforceable, the courts of this country must have regard to 
fundamental principles of justice and not to the letter of the rules which, either in our system, 
or in the relevant foreign system, are designed to give effect to those principles [emphasis 
added]. 
This statement is an almost perfect encapsulation of the submission that the 
principles of natural justice transcend their particularist domestic expression, and 
that it is these principles, and not their expressions, which are to be applied by 
domestic courts in enforcement applications. It is also worth noting the Court’s 
                                                
108 Ibid, at 435. 
109 Ibid, at 561. 
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rejection of an argument by the defendant that the principles of natural justice are 
essentially confined to the hearing rule.110  
 The Court was moved to find that the Tyler 2 decision was contrary to the 
principles of natural justice because the methodology pursuant to which damages 
were calculated was not a judicial one (and was in fact in breach of relevant 
procedural rules), but rather was characteristic of those used in settlement 
negotiations:111 
It seems to us that, in truth, [the Tyler 2 Judge] was applying to the process of assessment of 
damages in default, when only the plaintiffs were represented before him, the process and 
technique appropriate to a settlement negotiated between both the plaintiffs and defendants 
with the invention of the judge… The only basis upon which [the Judge could assert that an 
average of $75,000 per plaintiff, to be allocated by the plaintiffs’ counsel] was a proper 
figure was that, if the defendants had been present and taking part, they would probably 
have refused to settle for [a higher figure, but would], in probability, have agreed to pay 
[the $75,000 average per plaintiff]… While damages calculated on an average per plaintiff basis 
may make very good sense for the purposes of a settlement, because defendants are not concerned 
with how the total will be divided up, a judicial award so calculated is the antithesis of an award 
based upon the individual entitlements of the respective plaintiffs [emphasis added].  
Moreover, the principles of natural justice afforded the defendants a constructive 
reasonable expectation that the extent of their liability would be assessed by the 
judge with respect to evidence in accordance with the applicable procedures.112 
That is, the quantum of damages ought to have been determined with respect to 
the actual circumstances of the plaintiffs, rather than divined by reference to 
largely hypothetical settlement figures assumed to be acceptable to the 
defendants. 
                                                
110 Ibid, at 563-564; the argument was based on an imperfect construction of statements in Jacobson v 
Frachon (1928) 138 LT 386 (CA). 
111 Ibid, at 564-567. 
112 Ibid, at 568. This approach was restated, with approval, in Joint Stock Company “Aeroflot Russian 
Airlines” v Berezovsky and Glushkov [2012] EWHC 3017 at [55]. 
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 It is submitted that a number of interesting propositions can be derived from 
the reasoning in Adams case which are relevant to the review of arbitral awards 
by domestic courts on the grounds of natural justice. The first, as noted above, is 
that it is the fundamental principles of natural justice, not their particular 
expressions, which are to be applied. Secondly, natural justice is not confined 
merely to the hearing rule. And finally, the principles of natural justice require 
that procedure be of a sufficiently judicial character. In this respect, the 
requirement that decisions be based on appropriate evidence is indispensible.  
IV.    The Fundamental Issue with the Status Quo 
The central issue with the way in which national courts apply natural justice in 
review of arbitral awards is the tendency for each national jurisdiction to apply its 
own particular standards and conceptions of natural justice. As an example in the 
New Zealand context it has been opined that, because of a lack of definition of 
natural justice in Article 34 of the Model Law, resort must be had to the common law 
in determining the principles content.113 The same position has been taken in 
Australia.114 The problem is particularly severe in jurisdictions which do not have a 
history of familiarity with international commercial arbitration, and are 
consequently not immune from “misplaced sentiments of visceral judicial 
parochialism” in the context of recognition and enforcement.115 This kind of 
domestic-centric approach is problematic because it is inconsistent with the 
fundamentally trans-national character of natural justice in the context of 
international commercial arbitration. It is also inconsistent with the internationalist 
spirit of the New York Convention and the Model Law. The following paragraphs 
discuss that spirit, and put forward the suggestion that the domestic-centric 
                                                
113 Methanex Motonui, above n 1, at [148]-[149]. 
114 Castel Electronics, above n 27, at [56]. 
115 Michael Hwang and Shaun Lee “Survey of South East Asian Nations on the Application of the 
New York Convention” in Journal of International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2008) at 892. 
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approach may be the result of an undesirable conflation of two concepts: due process 
and public policy.  
A. The Internationalist Spirit of the New York Convention and Model Law 
At the outset, it should be stressed that the New York Convention represents an 
instrument of trans-national commercial law.116 Its key advantage is the provision of 
a “degree of certainty a party can have that an award will be recognised and 
enforced almost anywhere in the world”.117 Such certainty is undermined by 
particularist domestic interpretations of natural justice. It is promising, however, 
that many jurisdictions appear to be moving towards increasingly internationalist 
interpretations:118  
Occasional surprises and disappointments notwithstanding, the [Convention’s] 
interpretation is encouraging. National courts presented with applications for recognition 
and enforcement have made progress along a learning curve.  In a great number of 
jurisdictions, courts have adopted the interpretive canon of teleology, that is, the principle 
that interpretation of a provision should heed the provision’s legislative purposes. In the 
case of the Convention, the purpose was to favour recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards, that is, to provide for a predictable outcome where parties to a business transaction 
chose this dispute resolution mechanism. Moreover, many judges are aware that, as 
virtually all modern trans-nation commercial law instruments explicitly provide, “regard is 
to be had to its international character and the need to promote uniformity in its application” 
[emphasis added]. 
That a driving force behind the New York Convention (and Articles 34 and 36 of the 
Model Law by the adoption of materially identical language) was the intention to 
create internationally consistent criteria for the enforcement and recognition of 
arbitral awards is evident from its purpose in correcting the perceived failings of the 
                                                
116 Kronke, Nacimiento, Otto and Port Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global 
Commentary on the New York Convention (Wolters Kluwer, Great Britain, 2010) at 1-2. 
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118 Ibid, at 4. 
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previous 1927 Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards.119 Key 
among those failings was the fact that the Convention’s:120 
reliance on national laws left the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards subject to 
the many differences between national provisions and practices and allowed parties to raise 
objections to recognition and enforcement on the basis of national idiosyncrasies and forms 
of procedure that might not reflect prevailing trends. 
In a similarly internationalist vein the General Assembly in its recommendation that 
States give due consideration to adoption of the Model Law spoke of “the 
desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures” and the appropriateness 
of the “establishment of a unified legal framework” in a “model law on arbitration 
that is acceptable to States with different legal, social and economic systems, [which] 
contributes to the development of harmonious international economic relations”.121 
Moreover, in its 2006 resolution on the revision of the Model Law it was convinced 
that “the promotion of a uniform interpretation and application of the [New York 
Convention] is particularly timely”.122 This view has been taken up by various 
scholars – it has been observed that the natural justice exception “creates an 
international substantive rule” and “contains standard and uniform 
requirements”.123 
B. The Development of Parochialism 
                                                
119 Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards 92 LNTS 302 (1929-30). 
120 Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro Enforcement of Arbitral Agreements and International 
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123 Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman Traité de l’Arbitrage Commercial International (Litec, Paris, 1996) at 
[1696]. There is an update and English translation of this text comprised by: Fouchard, Gaillard and 
Savage (Ed) Fouchard Gaillard and Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1996); Poudret and Besson Comparative Law of International Arbitration (2nd 
ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006) at [910]. 
 
 
37 
 
It is now appropriate to examine a key reason why, despite the trans-national origins 
of natural justice and the internationalist aspirations of the New York Convention 
and Model Law, a domestic-centric approach to its application in review of arbitral 
awards by national courts is prevalent. It is suggested that an undesirable conflation 
exists between the concept of procedural fairness and the concept of public policy. It 
will be recalled that under Article V(1)(b) of the Convention (which is regarded as 
the “due process exception”)124 an award may be refused recognition and 
enforcement where a party was not given notice of the arbitration or was otherwise 
unable to present its case; while under Article V(2)(b) recognition and enforcement 
may be refused where the award is contrary to the public policy of the state in which 
enforcement is sought. Similar provisions are included in the Model Law. It is often 
the case that a party in an enforcement application will raise both grounds in relation 
to an alleged breach of procedural fairness.125 This is widely countenanced by 
national courts in that a breach of procedural fairness may be contrary to that state’s 
public policy.126 In the cases of Australia and New Zealand, specific additions to the 
Model Law have been made which render any breach of natural justice ipso facto 
contrary to those countries’ public policy.127  
 It is submitted, however, that the conflation of these concepts is unnecessary, 
undesirable and inefficient. In the first place, it adds nothing to the due process 
grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement which already exist in the New 
York Convention and Model Law. Because the broad right to present one’s case is 
already safeguarded, the only reasonable justification for refusing recognition and 
enforcement because of a breach of natural justice, via the public policy ground, is if 
the existing due process protections are insufficient to ensure procedural fairness. 
That is, there must be some aspect of natural justice which is not covered by the 
existing protections, such that recourse to the public policy exception is necessary. 
                                                
124 Kronke, above n 116, at 233. 
125 Kronke, above n 116, at 235 
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127 Arbitration Act 2006 (NZ) ss 34(6)(b) and 36(3)(b); and International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 
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The strongest candidate for this aspect is the rule against bias, the other fundamental 
aspect of natural justice. It is submitted, however, that the rule against bias is in fact 
included in the non-public policy grounds. This is so in two ways. The first is that, as 
will be recalled, the principle that each party must have the opportunity to present 
its case includes that case being given proper and fair consideration. An adjudicator 
who is not impartial cannot give a proper and fair consideration to a party’s case. 
Therefore, the hearing rule includes the rule against bias. Alternatively, Articles 
V(1)(d) of the New York Convention and 36(1)(iv) of the Model Law provide that an 
award may be refused recognition and enforcement on the ground that “…the 
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing 
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place”. Article 34(2)(iv) of the Model Law allows for the setting aside 
of an award on materially similar grounds. It is reasonable to assume that the rule 
against bias would be included in the arbitration agreement, expressly or as an 
implied term. Failing that, it would surely part of the lex loci arbitri.  
 The negative effects of including due process in public policy are manifold. The 
public policy exception is explicitly designed to bring domestic and particularist 
concerns to the fore at the enforcement stage: Article V(2)(b) of the Convention 
provides that recognition and enforcement may be refused if such would be 
“contrary to the public policy of that country”. This is consistent with other references 
to “that country” in which recognition and enforcement is sought. It is in contrast to 
the grounds in Article V(1) which contain no analogous references to the particular 
standards of the country where enforcement is sought. Including natural justice in 
the public policy exception opens the way for the domestication of natural justice in 
a manner which is not justified on the original language and context of the New 
York Convention and Model Law. Moreover, where due process forms part of public 
policy, the number of claims appearing under the public policy ground is 
multiplied.128 As it was famously put by Borrough J in Richardson v Melish:129 
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I, for one, protest, as my Lord has done, against arguing too strongly upon public policy;- it 
is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry 
you.  
Because of the ambiguity inherent in the concept, claimants tend to rely on it as a 
“fall-back” claim. The profusion of such claims can only contribute to the 
inefficiencies, delays and costs associated with the judicial process. It is therefore 
sensible to restrict the content of the public policy exception as much as is 
reasonable. Moreover, including natural justice within the public policy exception 
can only intensify the risks referred to in Parsons & Whittlemore v Societe Generale that 
the domestic courts of one State may use the exception to improperly refuse 
recognition and enforcement of awards rendered in another State.130 The inclusion of 
natural justice in the public policy ground in the recognition and enforcement 
context serves no real purpose and is undesirable.  
 If, however, the conflation of natural justice and public policy is insisted upon, it 
is submitted that, in order for a breach of the former to constitute a breach of the 
latter, that former breach should be of internationalised rather than particularist 
standards. This is not utterly alien to the current practice of a number of states who, 
in the recognition and enforcement context, consider the “public policy” referred to 
in Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention to be their “international public 
policy” rather than their domestic one.131 
V.    The Solution: Natural Justice Internationalised  
It is useful at this point to give a brief summary of the position thus far reached. The 
above examination of the theoretical foundations of arbitration has provided a 
theory which considers the system to be of a supra- or trans-national nature. Certain 
policy considerations have been explored, the most important of which for present 
purposes is the desirability of international consistency in international commercial 
arbitration. Consideration of the legal sources of natural justice has revealed those to 
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lie in general principles of law common to civilised nations. These principles have 
been codified in international instruments like the New York Convention and the 
Model Law. This has been done in an internationalist spirit. In light of all this, it is 
appropriate that the principles of natural law as they apply in the context of 
international arbitration should be internationalised, and national courts in review of 
awards should respect, uphold and further this internationalisation.  
A. The Precedent of Human Rights Law 
It is submitted that this kind of internationalisation of fundamental principles has 
analogous precedent in the context of human rights law. Human rights are said to be 
applicable universally.132 As such, their content is trans-national and should be given 
equal effect irrespective of the particular jurisdiction in which their vindication is 
sought. There is no room for particularist opinions as to what constitutes a human 
right (at least in the broad sense of the words). It is submitted that the principles of 
natural justice share in this universal applicability because of their universal nature, 
and, a fortiori, because a party’s entitlement thereto is itself a human right. As the 
Universal Declaration makes clear:133 
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him. 
While minor modifications may be made to this statement to suit the arbitral context 
– a “public hearing” is not required – the principles it enshrines apply to any 
determination of a party’s rights and obligations by an adjudicatory body.  
 In addition to the Universal Declaration, there are many other affirmations of 
natural justice as a universal human right. A significant one of these is the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Article 6(1) of that convention relevantly provides 
that: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
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reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.134 A 
survey of authorities on the applicability of the European Convention in the arbitral 
context will show how, in the human rights context, natural justice may be applied 
in a consistent way across various jurisdictions. While the Convention’s text and 
travaux préparatoires make no mention explicit of its applicability to arbitration,135 the 
position is as follows. Prima facie, “everyone” is entitled to the protection of Article 
6(1) in the determination of his or her civil rights and obligations, which may be 
done by arbitration.136 While some scholars argue that a party’s entering into an 
agreement to arbitrate constitutes a waiver of its rights under Article 6(1),137 the 
better view is that:138  
It cannot be deduced from the mere choice of having a dispute settled by consensual 
arbitration instead of by a national court that the application of the [European Convention] 
is wholly excluded. The right to a fair trial is part of all democratic countries and as a 
concept ranks to the level of international public policy.  
The content of this right includes the hearing rule and the rule against bias. The 
former requires that a party be able to present its case, challenge that against it and 
to be represented by counsel, though the precise application of the rule will vary 
according to the facts of particular cases.139 The latter rule is applied with a 
subjective-objective test: the adjudicator must be actually (subjectively) impartial, as 
well as objectively impartial.140 Because the Convention is primarily concerned with 
the actions of States, Article 6(1) is not directly applicable to arbitrators and awards 
                                                
134 Council of Europe European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols Nos 11 and 14 (4 November 1950) ETS 5, art 6(1). 
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cannot be directly challenged in the European Court of Human Rights.141 
However:142 
A certain degree of State supervision [of the arbitration process] (through the setting up of 
an effective award annulment procedure) is required under article 6(1) [of the Convention] 
as to those very fundamental rights that cannot be waived… Such violation of a duty to 
provide for effective annulment proceedings securing the preservation of fundamental due 
process guarantees, stemming from article 6(1), is the area where States’ liability can be 
asserted. 
For present purposes, the significance of this regime is that States party to the 
Convention are required to establish annulment procedures which ensure the 
observance of the fundamental rules of natural justice. That is, natural justice qua a 
human right, existing on a trans-national level, is so essential to the operation of 
adjudicative processes that it compels the conformity of particular legal systems to 
its requirements. This lends support to the argument that the principles natural 
justice exists on a supra-national level, and should be interpreted and applied 
domestically as such.  
B. Drawing the Threads Together: Natural Justice in International Arbitration 
It is appropriate at this point to draw certain conclusions in light of the foregoing 
discussion. It will be recalled that the core aspects of international arbitration are its 
essentially private and contractual nature. Four theoretical conceptions of arbitration 
have been discussed, the most effective of which for present purposes is Gaillard’s 
trans-national approach. Normative considerations pertaining to the integrity of the 
arbitral system, the finality of awards, the autonomy of the system and the need for 
international consistency have been canvassed. It is hoped that a case has been made 
for the application of natural justice in the review of arbitral awards by national 
courts should be internationalised, being derived from general principles of law. The 
core aspects of natural justice are the rights to impartial treatment and to be heard. It 
is submitted that the success of international commercial arbitration (and therefore 
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its future) lies in its universality and high degree of independence from the 
peculiarities of national legal systems, effected largely by (at least in the setting aside 
and recognition and enforcement context) the New York Convention and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law: “indeed, the popularity of arbitration as a means of 
resolving trans-national commercial disputes is in no small measure attributable to 
the conclusion and subsequent wide acceptation of [the Convention]”.143 The 
significance and central importance of the Convention and Model Law in 
international commercial arbitration “makes it even more important that the 
Convention is interpreted uniformly by the courts [emphasis in original].144  
 In practice, there are two ways in which this may be achieved. The first concerns 
the development of a Protocol which clarifies the meaning of the Convention in a 
way which domestic courts may adopt. This approach was in fact suggested to 
UNCITRAL in 1976, though it was rejected.145 Though the rejection “[m]ay be 
questioned”, there are practical problems associated with the development of a 
Protocol of this kind – it may take considerable time before all parties to the 
Convention become parties to the Protocol, and some parties to the former may 
deem adoption of the latter unnecessary, resulting in a confused international legal 
regime.146 The second way in which a uniform interpretation may be achieved is by 
the analysis of the Convention in light of the rules of treaty interpretation and the 
comparison of consistent case law across Contracting States.147 It is this approach 
which is preferred. Because the New York Convention is a treaty, and the Model 
Law in relevant part largely follows the Convention, the foundational interpretation 
of the natural justice ground for setting aside and refusal of recognition and 
enforcement should flow from the general provisions of the Vienna Convention on 
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the Law of Treaties.148 The most important of these provide that treaties must be 
interpreted in good faith, in accordance with their ordinary meaning and in light of 
their text, object and purpose, as well as with reference to travaux préparatoires where 
appropriate.149 There is cause to be enthusiastic about this possibility. Poudret and 
Besson’s comparative study of fundamental principles of procedure applicable in 
international arbitration found that while they may be “express[ed] in [domestic] 
laws using a varied terminology… there are no major divergences between the 
various legal orders except in a few points”.150 At the very least, the most basic 
elements of natural justice are present.151 Given at least some extant level of 
agreement as to the significance and content of natural justice across domestic 
jurisdictions, the full internationalisation of those principles should not be seen as 
radical. 
C. Concluding Remarks 
International commercial arbitration is a significant dispute resolution mechanism 
for international economic actors. It operates on the international plane. While one of 
its key advantages is its flexibility and amenability to parties’ agreement as to its 
procedure, it must and does retain some mandatory standards of natural justice. In 
the setting aside and recognition and enforcement context, it is the courts of national 
jurisdictions to which the responsibility of enforcing these standards falls. It is well 
in keeping with the trend of increasing inter-connectedness and inter-dependence of 
global economic activity that these standards be supra- or trans-national standards. 
It should not come as a surprise to domestic judicial bodies to be called upon to 
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embrace an internationalist spirit when it comes to natural justice in arbitration 
given the origin of that justice in trans-national instruments, general principles of 
law and ultimately, natural law itself. It is hoped that the internationalisation of 
natural justice principles will contribute to the development of a legal environment 
of which we may truthfully say: “on the whole, in the tug-of-war between 
parochialism and internationalism, internationalism has won.”152  
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